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This paper attempts to offer a contribution to the Post-Keynesian/structuralist literature that has 
discussed formalizations of Hyman Minsky’s concept of “financial fragility.”
1 In our view, the 
models and findings of this influential “formal Minskyan” literature (FML from now on) can be 
better appreciated in the context of another―closely related and only slightly older―literature, 
sometimes called “stock-flow consistent” (SFCL from now on) and associated with the names 
of James Tobin and Wynne Godley
2.    
  More precisely, we argue that virtually all “closed economy” models in the FML can be 
phrased as special cases (or “closures”)
3 of a particular SFC accounting framework that, in this 
sense, can be deemed “general.” The use of such a framework appears to us, therefore, as 
indispensable to any rigorous attempt to discuss the nature and impact of the (several) 
simplifying and/or implicit assumptions usually adopted in the FML. In other words, we 
propose here a systematic, “general,” way to approach the FML. Such a systematization, we 
argue, is a pre-requisite to the development of a future consensual “formal Minskyan” model 
that is both rigorous and flexible enough to be applied to the analysis of fiscal and monetary 
policies in actual economies.   
  We aim to make these points in five steps. First, we discuss the general tenets of the 
SFCL. Second, we present a brief description of the FML. Third, we present our “general” SFC 
accounting framework. Fourth, we discuss the representative models of Taylor and O’Connel 
(1985), Lavoie (1986-1987), Franke and Semmler (1989), Skott (1994), and Delli Gatti et. al. 
(1994) in light of our “general framework,” and access―in an introductory and non-exhaustive 
way―the impact of the simplifying and/or implicit assumptions adopted in these writings. Fifth, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Lavoie (1986-87), Delli Gatti et.al. (1994), Skott (1994), Nasica (2000), as well as many of the 
articles collected in Semmler (1989), Fazzari and Papadimitriou (1992), Dymski and Pollin (1994), and 
Bellofiore and Ferri (2001b, vol. 2). Kregel (2000, p.viii) called this literature “dynamic Post-Keynesian,” though 
only for the lack of a “better name.” Other labels such as “financial structuralism,” or “dynamic theories of 
monetary market economies” have also been used to describe it.    
2 Examples of Yale-type models are Backus et.al. (1980) and Tobin (1982). The “British team” is represented by 
Godley and Cripps (1983, especially chapter 6), Godley (1996 and 1999a), and Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) 
among others. It’s interesting to notice that Tobin himself didn’t call his models “stock-flow consistent.” Yale 
people (like Fair, 1984, p.40 for example) called Tobin’s the “pitfalls approach,” in a reference to the seminal 
paper by Brainard and Tobin (1968). The expression “stock-flow consistent” is commonly associated with the 
works of Wynne Godley (though used also by Davis 1987a, and 1987b; and Patterson and Stephenson, 1988, 
among others), but it seems to us that it can and should be applied more generally. 
3 As put by Taylor (1991, p.41), “Formally, prescribing a closure boils down to stating which variables are 
endogenous or exogenous in an equation system largely based upon macroeconomic accounting identities, and 




we phrase the path-breaking model by Taylor and O’Connel as a “closure” of our “general 
framework” to illustrate what exactly can go wrong when the SFC approach is not adopted. The 
sixth part of this paper summarizes and concludes.      
1 – THE STOCK FLOW CONSISTENT APPROACH  
The bulk of macroeconomic research assumes the form (or is done with the help) of 
mathematical models and/or literary descriptions that fail to take systematically into 
consideration the logical (“economy-wide”) constraints one knows for sure to exist in any 
economy considered “as a whole.” The basic insight of the SFCL is that these constraints 
introduce considerable structure to an otherwise virtually intractable macroeconomic reality.  
SFC practitioners, therefore, base their models on detailed accounting frameworks that 
consistently integrate financial flows of funds with a full set of balance sheets. These 
frameworks not only provide a concise (and yet careful) description of the model, but also a 
consistency check mechanism to its theoretical hypotheses (since they ensure that every 
assumed flow comes from somewhere and goes somewhere and savings and capital gains add to 
stocks of wealth and/or debt). Besides that, and maybe more important, they allow one to 
identify with precision the logical inter-relations between the transactions among the sectors, 
both in a given period (or Post-Keynesian “short run”) and between periods. It is recognized, of 
course, that accounting frameworks are “skeletons” (Taylor, 2004, p. 1), that only “come to life 
as (...) economic model(s)” (Backus et.al., 1980, p. 262) when behavioral assumptions are added 
to it
4. But it is precisely the alleged completeness and consistency of their “skeletons” that lead 
SFC authors to believe their models are closer than others to the goal of providing 
macroeconomists with logical equivalents of (fully coherent) “artificial economies.”
5 
In somewhat schematic terms, the SFC methodology consists of three “steps”: (i) do the 
(SFC) accounting first; (ii) establish the relevant behavioral relationships after that; and then 
                                                 
4 See Terzi (1986-1987) for evidence that the distinction between economic models and accounting exercises is not 
always clear in the literature. 
5 It’s recognized also that most existing macroeconomic models and literary descriptions are based (explicitly or 
not) on some kind of (social) accounting framework, but emphasis is put on the fact that these frameworks almost 
invariably focus only on flows or deal with stocks and flows inconsistently. As a consequence, these works fail to 
identify and/or take into consideration all “system-wide” implications of their hypotheses. While it’s true that for 
many applications this (often neglected) bias may not be relevant, SFC authors argue that this has to be proved 
rather than simply asserted. As put by Tobin (1982, p. 188), “a model whose solution generates flows but 
completely ignores their consequences may be suspected of missing phenomena important even in a relatively 




(iii) perform “comparative dynamics” exercises (generally with the help of computer 
simulations) to see how the model behaves. The remaining of this section is dedicated to a brief 
discussion of these “steps.”   
The first thing a SFC theorist must do in order to analyze a given issue is to make sure 
he or she has an “adequate” SFC accounting framework to deal with it. What the theorist gets 
from this accounting exercise is the whole set of “system-wide” logical implications of his or 
her own hypotheses. These come in three kinds. First, there is the “intrinsic SFC dynamics of 
the system,” i.e. the fact that flows and capital gains and losses necessarily increase or decrease 
stocks and these, by their turn, influence future flows. Second, there are the “sectoral budget 
constraints,” i.e. the fact that in each accounting period the decisions of economic agents alone 
and in the aggregate are constrained by what they have in the beginning of the period, what they 
earn during the period and their access to credit. Third, there are the “adding up” constraints, i.e, 
the fact that accounting identities imply that the whole must necessarily equal the parts and 
certain (combinations of) stocks and flows must necessarily equal others. Concentrated attention 
on these logical requirements differentiates SFC macro models from conventional Keynesian 
ones. Many authors explored some implications of some of these logical requirements in the 
past, but very few of them realized/emphasized the importance of always trying to explore all 
the implications of all of them.  
A careful analysis of these requirements has important implications also for the choice of 
the behavioral equations of the model, the second step of the SFC approach. First, the use of 
SFC accounting frameworks makes clear the necessity to theorize about stock-flow ratios (since 
they have non-trivial dynamic implications). Second, and perhaps more obvious, the use of any 
accounting framework implies a given number of degrees of freedom to the system and this 
limits the number of possible “model closures.” Note, however, that in complex accounting 
structures the nature of these degrees of freedom may not be obvious at first sight. In particular, 
the use of a water-tight SFC accounting framework implies that in an economy with n sectors, 
the financial flows of the nth sector are completely determined by the financial flows of the 
other n-1 sectors of the economy.
6 This fact has nothing to do with the neoclassical 
concepts/assumptions such as Walras’s Law, utility maximizing individual agents, market 
equilibrium and etc. It happens simply because what sectors 1 to n-1 (in the aggregate) pay to 
sector n is equal to what sector n receives from these sectors and vice-versa.    
                                                 




After the first two steps what one generally gets is a complicated system of non-linear 
difference/differential equations. The third step, naturally, is to perform a series of comparative 
dynamics exercises to evaluate the sensitivity of the model dynamics to changes in parameters 
and key exogenous variables. Given that analytic solutions to these systems are seldom 
available, SFC practitioners often must use computer simulations to approximate them.  
The relative merits of the SFC approach are perhaps clearer when conventional models are 
compared to their SFC counterparts. That’s what we plan to do in the following sections. Due to 
space limitations we will limit ourselves to the analysis of the formal structures of the models, 
leaving aside complications related to the third step above.           
 
2 – A QUICK LOOK AT THE FML   
 
At the risk of oversimplification, one can divide the literature dealing with Minskyan themes in 
three main groups. A first group, exemplified by many of the papers in Fazzari and 
Papadimitriou (1992) and Bellofiore and Ferri (2001a, vol. 1), deals with literary and/or 
exegetical analyses of Minskyan topics. A second group, nicely surveyed in Nasica (2000, 
chapters 5 and 6), deals with (formal) New Keynesian analyses of these same topics. Here we 
will be concerned with a third (smaller) group, that according to Nasica (2000, p. 75) has 
embedded “simple financial variables (interest rates and indebtedness ratios) or more complex 
ones (indicators of fragility and financial tranquility) into standard macroeconomic frameworks” 
and “provided evidence that, under certain circumstances, such models produce fluctuations 
analogous to those imagined, but not modeled, by Minsky.”
7        
  These authors do agree that “Minsky’s theories are both microeconomic detailed and 
institutional (…) [and] this detail is rich and illuminating but beyond the reach of mere algebra” 
                                                 
7 Our negligence of the “New Keynesian” literature has four main reasons. First, it’s not unfair to argue that the 
New Keynesian literature has been more concerned with microeconomics than with macroeconomic modeling. In 
particular, many possible microfoundations have been suggested in this literature and it’s not obvious how to 
choose among them and/or incorporate them in a macroeconomic structure such as the one discussed above. 
Second, no matter how rational or irrational firms, households, banks, central bankers and government officials 
(we’d like, of course, to provide rationales for the actions of all these sectors, not just for a representative 
“Robinson Crusoe”) are, the logical implications discussed in the previous section will not change. Third, when 
and if someone comes up with good and reliable microfoundations for all the sectors mentioned above, their 
aggregate behavioral counterparts can be easily phrased as a “closure” to the accounting framework presented 
above. Fourth, the simplified macro models proposed by New Keynesian authors (see, on this respect Fair, 2002 
and Arestis and Sawyer, 2002) for example, are particularly bad as depictions of reality and, therefore, are not 
suited to “explain” (in the Post-Keynesian sense of, say, Lavoie, 1992, p. 6-10) it adequately. For an interesting 




(Taylor and O’Connell, 1985, first page). In particular, Minskyan concepts of “fragility and 
tranquility are multidimensional (…) and financial innovation and institutional change imply 
that precise definitions of these dimensions must depend on the historical and institutional 
contexts” (Skott, 1994, p. 52). On the other hand, they would also agree (explicitly or not) with 
Nasica’s (2000, p. 51) point that “the absence of modeling has sometimes made the consistency 
of Minsky’s arguments seem difficult to check.” In fact, their collective view was elegantly 
summarized by Foley (2001, p. 58), according to whom “mathematical models are tools to 
clarify our understanding of simplified, imaginary systems that we hope represent coherent 
aspects of a complex economic reality. They are possibly the only reliable tool for exploring the 
response of such imaginary worlds to parametric changes.”   
  The FML is therefore admittedly biased. It has focused on modeling only the “core” 
Minskyan insight, i.e. the idea that capitalist economies left on their own are prone to “financial 
fragility” and recurrent financial crises. Invariably, the FML has tried to do so with the help of 
“clever” investment functions (i.e. ones that cause the model to exhibit explosive, chaotic, or 
permanent cyclic behavior), which are made to depend (a la Minsky) on a variety of financial 
variables or indicators. The papers in this literature therefore differ on the specific “clever” 
investment function they use and on how (if at all) financial markets are modeled. In the best 
Minskyan/Keynesian tradition, consumption expenditures are not seen as a source of instability 
in the FML.
8 Moreover, this literature is relatively young
9 and most papers have been admittedly 
exploratory and/or pedagogical. The FML has succeeded in demonstrating that Minskyan 
processes can happen in a variety of circumstances but, as far as we know, it hasn’t produced a 
consensual formal “Minskyan” model so far.    
    We do believe that the first step to consensus-making is systematization. The next 
sections will, therefore, be dedicated to the analysis of some (representative, in our point of 
view) model specifications that have been discussed in the FML, with particular emphasis on 
their common features, simplifying assumptions, and internal logical consistency. Before we do 
that, however, we need to discuss an important methodological point, i.e. the emphasis some 
authors in the FML (e.g. Nasica, 2000, ch. 4) put on the alleged “superiority” of models that 
                                                 
8 Minsky firmly believed that “consumer and housing debt can amplify but (…) cannot initiate a downturn in 
income and employment” (Minsky, 1982, p. 30). It is interesting to note, in this context, the relative perplexity 
with which recent developments in the indebtedness levels of the U.S. household sector has been treated by 
“broadly Minskyan” authors such as Godley (1999b) and Papadimitriou et. al (2002).     




produce “chaotic” dynamics over ones that do not. The basic idea is that since most economic 
data do exhibit a heavily irregular cyclic behavior, models with such results (i.e. “chaotic” ones) 
are “better” or “more appropriate” than linear ones (that either converge to a dynamic steady 
state or “explode”/“implode”) and/or non-linear “limit cycles” ones (that produce cycles “too 
regular to be true”).  
  This view can be criticized on several grounds. First, when subjected to continuous 
random shocks, linear models can easily replicate the irregular cyclic behavior that characterizes 
macroeconomic data. Whether or not complex phenomena should be modeled as arising from 
(deterministic) chaotic dynamics or as a result of mere randomness is an issue that has 
entertained many scientific minds of our time and, as far as we know, no definitive conclusion 
has been reached so far. Second, from a more strict Minskyan perspective, the dynamics of 
“real” economies in historical time depend crucially on exogenous (from a “pure economic” 
point of view) factors. As phrased by Delli Gatti et. al. (1994, p.2) “in modern economies 
incipient or realized incoherence will lead to government interventions. (…) cycles result from a 
combination of endogenous interactions that can lead to incoherence and the impact of 
institutions and interventions that aim to contain these trusts towards incoherence.” Indeed, 
virtually all economists agree that parametric, institutional and historical change are not entirely 
determined by economic factors, so that the “relevant model” to describe the economy may and 
do change in true historical time. From this perspective, nothing prevents one from 
conceptualizing the economy as a simple linear explosive model whose behavior precipitates 
regime-changing interventions that generate a period of “tranquility” and a later resurgence of 
explosive behavior and so forth. Third, from a purely formal point of view, the dynamic 
behavior of a macroeconomic model may depend less on the “theoretical view” underlying it 
than on the specific functional forms assumed. In other words, it is relatively easy to come up 
with a non-linear version of, say, the Taylor-O’Connel model (that, according to Nasica, 2000, 
p.51, can be criticized “in particular” for its “linear nature”), provided small changes in either 
the functional forms (of, say, the investment function) or the simplifying assumptions (such as 
the absence of inflation) are made.                       
  Be that as it may, in what follows we will be more interested in the “spirit” of the 






3  ― A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR MINSKYAN ANALYSES OF CLOSED 
ECONOMIES  
 
Virtually all analysts would agree that a fair depiction of Minsky’s “Wall Street Paradigm” 
requires a model with at least households, firms, banks, and a government (including a central 
bank).
10,11 There is wide consensus also on the crucial role played by financial markets in 
Minskyan analyses. There is much less agreement, however, on how the financial structure of 
the economy should be modeled. It seems to us that an economy with such sectors would 
naturally have not only markets for bank loans and government bills, but also a stock market 
and an explicit treatment of the “discount” loans banks get from the Central Bank. These 
features of reality are often “simplified away” in the FML, despite playing a crucial role in 
Minsky’s literary writings.   
  Following Godley (e.g. 1996, 1999a), we use tables (1)-(3) below to summarize the 
accounting structure of our “artificial closed economy”―i.e., the balance sheets of all 
macroeconomic sectors assumed to exist in it, as well as the flow of funds and the uses and 
sources of funds matrixes (a la Copeland, 1952) associated to them.
12 Minsky often stressed the 
fact that “an ultimate reality in a capitalist economy is the set of interrelated balance sheets 
among the various units” (Minsky, 1975, p. 118), so that “one way every economic unit can be 
characterized is by its portfolio: the set of tangible and financial assets it owns and the financial 
liabilities on which it owes” (Minsky, 1975, p. 70). We therefore begin our exposition with the 
(nominal) balance sheets of the sectors in our “artificial economy.” These are depicted in table 1 
below, which we hope the reader will find self explanatory (the only non-trivial pieces of 
notation are “pe” for the price of one equity, and “E” for the number of equities issued).
13  
 
                                                 
10 Even though some illustrative “formal Minskyan” models of closed economies without a government have been 
proposed, for example, by Lavoie (1986-1987) and Skott (1994).   
11 This is not to say, of course, that Minskyan analyses are not valid in open economy contexts. We are fully aware 
of both the stream of papers (see, for example, Gray and Gray, 1994; Felix, 1994; and Wolfson, 2002) that have 
argued precisely the opposite and the recent SFC open economy literature that can be used to formalize them 
(see, for example, Godley, 1999c and Godley and Lavoie, 2003). However, most writers in the FML seem to 
agree that the essence of Minsky’s insights can be captured in a closed economy framework. 
12The “artificial economy” discussed here is essentially the same discussed in Zezza and Dos Santos (forthcoming), 
though we chose to present table 2 differently. The only differences are that here firms hold bank deposits and do 
not pay direct taxes on their profits.    
13 Similar tables do appear often in the FML. See, for example, Taylor and O’Connel (1985), Franke and Semmler 




Table 1 summarizes many theoretical assumptions. In particular, its empty cells make 
clear we are simplifying away some facts of life, such as bank loans to households, money 
holdings of the government, and equity issues and holdings of banks (hence our emphasis on the 
artificiality of the economy discussed here). These simplifications, as well the assumption that 
the net worth of banks is zero (or macroeconomically “very small”), are common in both the 
FML and the SFCL. The economy assumed here is actually more complete than the ones 
described in the FML, though, for we don’t simplify away central bank advances and money 
holdings of firms―both of which play a crucial role in Minskyan analyses in our view.     
 
Table 1. Balance sheets in our “artificial economy” 
A (+) sign before a variable denotes an asset while a (-) sign denotes a liability 
  Households Firms  Banks Central  Bank Government Total 
1 - High powered money          +Hh     +Hb -H    0 
2 - Central Bank advances          -A  +A    0 
3 - Bank Deposits                     +Mh +Mf  -M      0 
4 - Loans            -L  +L     0 
5 - Bills      +Bh   +Bb  +Bc  -B 0 
6 - Capital         +K       +K 
7 - Equities   +E pe  -E pe        0 
8 - Net Worth                            + Vh  + Vf  0  0  -B  +K 
 
Table 1 also makes clear some logical implications of our theoretical assumptions. In 
particular, the identities in the first four columns and rows (1), (3), (5) and (8) play relevant 
roles in SFC models of economies like this one, as discussed in Zezza and Dos Santos 
(forthcoming).  
Minsky often stressed also that the “items in the balance sheets set up cash flows. Cash 
flows are the result of (1) the income-producing system, which includes wages, taxes and non-
financial corporate gross profits after taxes, (2) the financial structure, which is composed of 
interest, dividends, rents, and repayments on loans, and (3) the dealing or trading in capital 
assets and financial instruments. For all except dividends, the cash-flows determined by the 
financial structure are contractual commitments” (Minsky, 1975, p. 118). He actually went as 
far as stating that his own influential “alternative interpretation [of Keynes] can be summarized 
as a theory of the determination of the effective budget constraints [of the various 
macroeconomic sectors]. The economics of the determination of the budget constraint logically 




and consumption” (Minsky, 1975, p. 132).
14 Tables 2 and 3 below aim precisely to model these 
cash flows and budget constraints rigorously. 
Indeed, Table 2 is easier to understand when considered as a logical “flow” counterpart of 
Table 1. In particular, rows (7)-(10) depicting the interest and dividend payments of the 
economy are directly implied by the liability structure of the economy presented in Table 1, our 
implicit assumptions being that: (i) the nominal interest rate on money deposits (rm), bank loans 
(rl), government bills (rb), and central bank advancements (ra), are all fixed during a given 
accounting period; and (ii) interest on loans obtained in period “t” are paid in period “t+1” at 
rates pre-determined in “t.” Other non-trivial notation below includes Ff, Fb, Fc (that stand, 
respectively, for the distributed profits of firms, banks and the central bank), our assumptions 
being that: (i) banks do not pay taxes and distribute all their (nominal) “current profits” (or 
Marshallian “quasi-rents”), so that their net worth is zero; (ii) the central bank distributes all its 
“current profits” to the “Government” (understood here as a “Treasury”), so its net worth is 
zero; and (iii) firms do retain a part of their (after tax, current) profits, so that Fu stands for 
firms’ retained earnings. Moreover, DT stands for “direct taxes” (paid by the households on 
their income), while IT stands for “indirect taxes” (paid by the firms on their total receipts). This 
distinction is important, as we’ll discuss in more detail below. 
                                                 
14 It is therefore, very surprising to know that Minsky “was skeptical of the notion of sectoral budget restraints 
except for government” (Chick, 1992, p. 81), even though he “was very encouraging” about Chick’s SFC 
attempt. Given that Chick did not elaborate on the issue, it is impossible to know exactly what were the reason’s 
for Minsky’s skepticism. One possible reason would be the fact that the composition of ponzis, hedge and 
speculative finance (and therefore financial fragility) can fluctuate without any changes in the aggregate balance 
sheets, provided, say, that the increase in ponzi finance is counterbalanced by improvements in the balance sheets 
of the remaining hedge units. Minsky did, however, use aggregate variables as proxies of financial fragility in 





Table 2. Flows of Funds in our “artificial economy”  
A (+) sign before a variable denotes a receipt while a (-) sign denotes a payment 
  Households  Non Financial Firms 
   Currrent          Capital 
Govt Banks  Central 
Bank 
Total 
1 - Cons.   -C    +C  -  -  -  0 
2 - Govt. Expenditures        +G  -  -G    -  0 
3 - Invest.   - +∆K -  ∆K  -  -  0 
4 -                Accounting Memo: “Final” Sales at market prices ≡ S ≡ C + G + ∆K ≡ W + FT + IT 
5 - Wages  +W   -W - -  -  -  0 
6 - Taxes        -DT -IT  -  +T  -  -  0 
7 - Interest on Loans     - rl -1*L –1   - -  + rl -1*L -1 - ra 
-1*A -1 
+ ra -1*A -1 
 
0 
8 - Interest on Bills  + rb -1*Bh -1   -  - rb -1*B -1 +rb  -1*Bb -1 +rb  -1*Bc -1 
 
0 
9 - Interest on Deposits  +rm -1*Mh -1 +rm  –1*Mf–1  - -  -rm -1*M -1  - 0 
10-Dividends  +Ff  + Fb  -Ff   -  +Fc  -Fb  -Fc  0 
11- Total (Current)  Sh Fu  -    Sg 0 0  SAV 
 
Table 2 above makes sure “every financial flow comes from somewhere and goes 
somewhere,” (Godley, 1999a, p.394) and allows one to derive some important identities. In 
particular, adding up Sh (≡W + rb -1*Bh  –1+rm-1*Mh–1 +Ff+Fb –C – DT), i.e. the “current” 
savings of households, Fu (≡S - IT - Ff -  rl-1*L-1+rm–1*Mf-1), firms retained earnings, and 
government’s savings (Sg ≡ T + Fc – G - rb-1*B-1) one gets the economy’s total savings (SAV) 
that, as one would expect, ex-post is identical to investment (∆K). In what follows, the variable 
FT (≡ S–W- IT), or firms’ total “gross profits” in production will appear quite often.
15      
While table 2 above summarizes the “current” flows of funds between sectors logically 
implied by the stocks presented in table 1, table 3 below does the same with the “capital flows,” 
i.e., those that change the balance sheets of the sectors (including current savings and financial 
and real (dis)“investments”). In this sense, its columns can be interpreted (when its components 
are viewed as ex-ante variables) as aggregated budget constraints of their respective sectors. In 
other words, table 3 demonstrates how stocks (that will constrain the flow behavior in the next 
period) are modified by current flows. Indeed, the net worth of the sectors in Table 1 is related 
to the capital account flows in Table 2 by the accounting identity: 
NWt = NWt-1 + St + CGt 
                                                 
15 However, all models discussed here assume that Mf = 0, i.e. that firms have no liquid assets and, therefore, no 




or, in words, the net worth of a sector is increased by its current savings during the period, plus 
capital gains CG  arising from changes in the market value of its assets during the period.
16  
 
Table 3. Sources and uses of funds
17 




Cash  +∆Hh   +  ∆Hb -  ∆H   0 
Central Bank advances     -  ∆A +  ∆A   0 
Bank deposits  + ∆Mh +∆Mf -  ∆M     0 
Loans   -  ∆L +  ∆L     0 
Treasury Bills  + ∆Bh   +  ∆Bb +  ∆Bc -  ∆B 0 
Capital    + ∆K      + ∆K 
Equities  + ∆E·pe -  ∆E·pe       0 
Total  Sh Fu  0  0  Sg  SAV 
∆net Worth (Accounting 
Memo)   Sh + ∆peE-1  Fu - ∆peE-1  0 0  Sg SAV 
 
We finish this accounting “tour de force” reminding the reader that all accounts presented 
so far were phrased in nominal terms. Assuming a single price deflator p for all the variables, all 
stocks and flows in tables 1 and 2 above have straightforward “real” counterparts given by their 
nominal value divided by p. Adding a k to the variable name to denote its deflated value we 
have, for example: 
Sk =S/p = C/p + I/p + G/p  =Ck + Ik + Gk  
Things are somewhat different, however, with capital gains and losses. The purchasing 
power on the stock of equities will be increased by real capital gains arising from fluctuations in 
its market value, and decreased by changes in the price level, while the real value of all other 
assets will decline with inflation. Accordingly, the value of, say, the households’ real stock of 
wealth is given by: 
Vk = Vk-1 + Yk – Ck + ∆pet·E-1/pt - ∆p·Vk-1/pt    
A final point to make is that the real interest received ex-post on any asset can never be 
known ex-ante. Indeed, while the best one can know in time t is the nominal interest rate and 
general price level in t, the interest on loans made in t will only be received in t+1. In the 
following sections we will follow the authors in the FML and avoid inflation issues, though.  
                                                 
16 We assume that treasury bills last exactly one period, so that the only nominal capital gain in this model is 
obtainable from fluctuations in the market value of equities. 




4 – A SFC LOOK AT THE FML 
 
We do believe the seminal models to be discussed here―i.e. the ones proposed by Taylor and 
O’Connel (1985), Lavoie (1986-1987), Franke and Semmler (1989), Delli Gatti et.al. (1994
18), 
and Skott (1994)―are representative of the FML. In particular, they all played a crucial role in 
creating and consolidating the FML as a line of research. On the other hand, they are all 
exploratory attempts (most of the times) admittedly less than stock-flow consistent and/or 
general, often for different reasons. One has, therefore, a lot to learn from analyzing their 
(dis)similarities and inconsistencies.       
Rather than listing equations, a tedious procedure that has been known to scare readers 
away from the SFC approach, we proceed here with a typology of hypotheses/modeling 
strategies adopted by these models and their logical consequences. A more careful and formal 
analysis of the Taylor-O’Connel model is presented in the next section.   
 
4.1 – Investment Functions in the FML 
Minsky “characterized Keynes’s General Theory, as advancing an investment theory of 
business cycles and a financial theory of investment” (Friedman and Laibson, 1989, p. 175). 
Indeed, his literary descriptions of the determinants of investment are so rich as to be deemed by 
Kregel (1992, p. 86) “the more important and distinguished characteristic” of his work. The 
FML not always does justice to this richness, however, as depicted in table 4 below.  
Analyzing the specifications above one identifies three basic strategies used to model the 
impact of “financial fragility” on aggregate investment. A first one based on Taylor and 
O’Connel’s Ф expectational parameter; a second one, more in line with the models by Lavoie 
and Delli Gatti et. al., which emphasizes (no matter which specific functional form is used) the 
role of “internal finance availability;” and a third one, represented  by Skott’s “hybrid 
variables.” They do have a lot in common, as it turns out.    
 
                                                 





   Table 4: Investment Functions in the FML  





∆K = [g0 + h(r + Ф – rb)]*K 
“where ‘rb’ is the current interest rate [in government bonds](…)  Ф 
reflects the difference between anticipated return to holding capital and 
the current profit rate r. (…)g0  is a constant reflecting  autonomous 
capital stock growth and the coefficient h measures firms’ investment 
response to the expected difference between profit and interest costs” 




Same used by Taylor and O’Connel  
Lavoie 
(1986-1987)  ∆K = 
  x) - (1 * v
  pi * u * ret
K-1, where ret stands for the retention ratio of firms on 
gross profits (Fu/FT), pi (= FT / S) stands for the share of profits in total 
sales, u stands for the capacity utilization ratio (S/C), v stands for the  
technological capacity ratio (C =K/v), and x stands for the share of 
investment which is financed through external sources
20.  
Delli Gatti 
Et. al. (1994) 
∆K = avt + bt (FT - rp-1*L-1) 
where “a” is a constant; vt  stands for Minsky’s “Pk,” “rp”is the ratio of 
the gross payments due on firms’ outstanding  debt with banks (interest 
and principal), and, last but not least, bt = b0 +b1*arctg(FT-1), where 
b1*arctg(FT-1) is a non-linear increasing function and b0  represents the 




∆K = [aσ+ bF + cT +d]*K 
where a, b, c and d are constants, σ stands for the actual output-capital 
ratio  (S/K),  and F and T are “hybrid values” depicting both the 
“fragility” and the “tranquility” of the system.  
 
   Indeed, all of them try to capture the idea that investment growth can be good for a 
number of good “tranquil” years, before a crisis ensues. Taylor and O’Connel’s Ф expectational 
parameter is a good example. In Taylor and O’Connel’s original paper Ф’s rate of growth is 
assumed to be positive (negative) if the difference between the “current” interest rate and a 
“normal” (exogenous) long run interest rate is negative (positive), so a sudden rise (fall) in 
interest rates can initiate a cumulative decrease (increase) in investment and, therefore, a “debt 
deflation” (“boom”) process. As both Franke and Semmler (1989, p. 39) and Nasica (2000, 
p.53) pointed out, this particular formalization does not take into account the role of firms’ 
                                                 
19 Some notations of the original texts were adapted to the ones used in section 3 above.  
20 The formula above can be rewritten as an identity between the money spent in and received from investment 
expenditures. Lavoie, however, interprets it as an ex-ante behavioral assumption (even though he doesn’t advance 
any behavioral assumption for key variables such as “ret” and “x”). For a more recent Lavoie-type specification 




indebtedness and debt commitments in investment decisions―also emphasized, for example, by 
Delli Gatti et. al (1994) and Lavoie (1986-1987). However, as Franke and Semmler have 
showed, it’s perfectly possible to adapt the model to make the rate of growth of Ф a function of 
firms’ loans to capital ratio (L/K), therefore bridging the apparent gap between the two families 
of models. Given the relationship between “r,” “rl” and Minsky’s Pk, a Taylor and O’Connel 
specificaton with Ф depending negatively on L/K is not so different from, say, a Delli Gatti et.al 
specification. The same is true for a Lavoie specification, given the relationship between “u,” 
“pi” and “r,” and the relationship between “ret,” “x” and L/K.  
Differences are more apparent than real also as far as Skott’s approach is concerned, 
though the point here is subtler. Skott (1994, p.53) correctly points out that the identification of 
historical-institutional concepts like, say, “financial fragility” with a “single well defined 
element of the financial system [“e.g. ‘the interest rate’”]―and the exclusion of other aspects of 
the system would need to be justified, and the constant evolution of the financial system makes 
it difficult to provide such a justification.” It might very well be the case, and no author in the 
FML would deny it,
21 that in a given historical and institutional context, financial fragility can 
be a function of firms’ loans to capital ratio (L/K) and the interest rate paid on firms’ loans (rl), 
while in other contexts it might be more appropriate to define it as a function of, say, firms’ 
liquid assets to loans ratio (Mf/L) and the “interest plus repayment” rate on firms’ loans to banks 
(rp). Note, however, that the particular specifications of both “fragility” (F, or the sensibility of 
investment to negative shocks) and “tranquility” (T, or the firms’ ability to pay their financial 
commitments) used by Skott are not necessarily in line with the spirit of the FML. Indeed, he 
makes T a negative function of F and a positive function of the rate of profits (r), while F is 
assumed to be a positive function of both F-1 and T, what leaves the role of the interest rate and 
the debt commitments of firms somewhat in the air. Reasonable redefinitions of T and/or F 
would bring his analysis much closer to the rest of the FML, however.  
 
4.2 – How is Investment Financed? The Role of Banks and Financial Structures  
One doesn’t need the accounting above to argue in favor of the (often implicit) overall 
coherence of investment functions in the FML. Things change, however, as far as the analysis of 
the “dual” of these investment decisions, i.e. the financing decisions of firms, are concerned. 
                                                 
21 As Lavoie (1986-1987, p. 259) acknowledges, “it’s not an easy task to find a macroeconomic variable (…) [to] 
represent financial fragility.” Minsky himself (1982, ch. 1 and 2) and Niggle (1989), for example, used many of 




Given Minsky’s crucial hypothesis that “the economy “naturally” moves towards a more fragile 
financial system” (Lavoie, 1986-1987) and the crucial connection between the concept of 
financial fragility and the debt structures and commitments of (macroeconomic sectors in 
general and) firms (in particular), one would expect the FML to pay special attention to these 
decisions. Yet, most models in the FML have under-developed financial structures and, 
therefore, generally treat financing issues with oversimplified hypotheses that don’t do justice to 
the richness of Minskyan analyses.   
In particular, anyone working with a “Minskyan” economy such as the one depicted in 
section 3 above has to provide explanations to at least 3 interest rates  (rl, rb and rm), as well as 
for Pe (the price of equities). It so happens that the financing decisions of firms affect all of 
them either directly (as in the case of rl and Pe) or indirectly (through the impact of rl and Pe on 
the portfolio choices of households). Given the feedback effects of these variables in the 
“financial fragility of firms” (through, for example, debt repayments), heroic assumptions about 
them are bound to hurt the overall consistency/plausibility of the model. SFC models are 
particularly good on many of these issues, as we’ll discuss below
22. The same cannot be said of 
the FML, however, as table 5 makes clear:  
                                                 
22 See, for example, Backus et. al. (1980), Godley (1999a), Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002), and Zezza and Dos 





Table 5: Financial Structures in the FML 
Model Financial  Structure 
Taylor and  
O’Connel (1985) 
There are markets for government bills, cash and corporate stocks, 
but equity emission is the only way firms have to finance their 
investment (since all profits are assumed to be distributed and there 
are no bank loans)
23. Banks (i.e. “financial intermediaries”) are not 
formally modeled.   
Franke and 
Semmler  (1989) 
Develops Taylor and O’Connel’s model incorporating explicitly 
banks and a market for bank loans. It assumes that the rate of 
growth of L depends (negatively) on L/K and positively on (r + Ф 
– rl) i.e. the difference between the “expectation adjusted” rate of 
profits and the interest rate on loans. Besides that, it assumes that 
the net worth of firms is zero, and the stock market is always in 
equilibrium, so that given ∆K,  ∆L,  and households’ demand for 
stocks, PeE is determined. Given the (neoclassical, Modigliani-
Miller type) hypothesis of zero net worth of firms, the role of 
retained profits is disconsidered (as in Taylor and O’Connel). No 
particular attention is paid to banks’ profitability in determining rl.    
Lavoie(1986-1987)  No discussion of “financing” issues is provided.  
Delli Gatti et. al. 
(1994) 
The only sources of finance are retained earnings and bank loans 
(so there’s no stock markets and “equity investment grows by 
means of retained earnings”). Ff is implicitly assumed to be equal 
to zero. Government finance (and therefore the market for bills) is 
“heroically ignored” (even though the role of government 
expenditures in total profits is explicitly modeled). The 
composition of the balance sheets of households and banks are also 
ignored. The only market that is explicitly modeled is the market 
for bank loans (the supply of loans by banks is assumed to be a 
increasing function of rp, while the demand of loans is given by ∆K 
- FT - rp-1*L-1. Banks’ profitability has no role in determining rp.  
Skott (1994, 
appendix) 
The only sources of finance are retained earnings and bank loans. 
There’s no public sector in the economy and the composition of the 
balance sheets of households and banks is ignored. The only 
financial market explicitly modeled is the market for bank loans (rl 
is assumed to be fixed; the supply of loans by banks is assumed to 
be horizontal until a given “credit ceiling in terms of a maximum 
ratio of debt to capital,” while the demand of loans is given by ∆K –
FT -rl-1 *L-1 –Ff. Banks’ profitability have no role in determining rl.  
 
  It seems fair, therefore, to conclude that, with the exception of the Franke and Semmler 
model (albeit with essentially “non-Minskyan” hypotheses), the FML has not devoted attention 
to modeling the financing decisions of firms. In particular, with the partial exceptions of Taylor 
                                                 
23 Clearly enough, firms in the aggregate cannot use their own capital gains to finance investment (for no other 
macroeconomic sector is assumed to buy their capital) and, since they do not retain profits or get loans, the only 




and O’Connel and Franke and Semmler, no rigorous connection is made in this literature 
between these decisions and the portfolio decisions of households and banks in the 
determination of the interest rates. By limiting all the (explicit) “action” in its models to the 
investment functions, the financing of which it doesn’t care to discuss rigorously, the FML has 
failed to formalize Minsky’s “crucial hypothesis” mentioned above. As Lavoie (1986-1987, p. 
260-261) and column 2 in table 3 above make clear, investment growth (i.e., bigger values of 
∆K/K) doesn’t necessarily imply an increase in financial fragility (say, bigger values of ∆L/K 
and/or smaller values of Hf/K)
24.  
In other words, even though it has showed “evidence” that “under certain circumstances” 
capitalist economies fluctuate in a “Minskyan way,” the FML has failed to demonstrate that 
these circumstances are plausible ones―for it hasn’t discussed the implications of the 
investment behavior assumed to banks’ profitability, and therefore, the overall viability of the 
financial structures it assumes.                
 
4.4 – Aggregate Budget Constraints in the FML 
Another―more general way―to phrase the critique above, is to point out that the FML has not 
made a systematic effort to take into consideration the aggregate budget constraints faced by the 
macroeconomic sectors assumed in its models.  
It so happens that these budget constraints (explicitly modeled in table 3 above) are 
crucial to a rigorous treatment of both the supplies of and demands for the various financial 
assets assumed in Minskyan analyses (and, therefore, their respective interest rates and prices). 
Indeed, Keynesian authors generally view these supplies and demands as being determined by 
the portfolio decisions of agents (or, more precisely, of the “macroeconomic sectors”), but these 
presuppose the aforementioned budget constraints. One can only model, say, the impact of 
households’ portfolio decisions (or, more concretely, how they split their wealth in equities, 
government bills, bank deposits and cash) on (these) financial markets if one knows the size of 
households’ wealth. The same is true for the impact of firms’s and banks’ liability management 
and portfolio decisions. In fact, Minsky’s own analysis of actual policy-making―especially 
monetary policy-making in the U.S (see, for example, Kregel, 1992, p.96 and Minsky, 1986, 
                                                 
24 In the same direction, Delli Gatti et. al. (1994, footnote 14)  points out that “the greater the ratio of  equity to debt 
financing the greater the chance the firm will be a hedge financial unit.” Minskyan authors such as Nasica (2000, 
ch. 5) have noticed that one is more likely to find discussions of how firms finance themselves in the New 




p.322)―depends crucially on these considerations. These supplies and demands, together with 
the actions of the government and the central bank and the “microstructure” of financial markets 
operate (that will determine whether they “clear” instantaneously or not and so forth) do 
determine in a broad Minskyan/Post-Keynesian/SFC view the actual outcomes in financial 
markets, being therefore crucial to formalizations of the financial fragility hypothesis.  
  The usual SFC way to deal with these issues is to derive the budget constraints of all 
macroeconomic sectors (as discussed above) and “close” them with explicit behavioral 
assumptions.
25 Households, in particular, are assumed to have Tobinesque demands for assets. 
These ensure that households respond to (expected) differentials in the rates of return of the 
various assets in ways deemed “rational” (i.e., a bigger expected rate of return increases the 
share of the asset in the sector’s portfolio) and consistent (i.e., such an increase leads to a 
decrease in the combined share of the other assets in the sector’s portfolio, so that its budget 
constraint is respected), but are usually modeled with no regard to Minskyan/Post Keynesian 
“liquidity preference” considerations. A Minskyan specification would presumably include a 
“liquidity preference” determinant to the elegantly constrained Tobinesque specifications.
26 The 
FML does not always proceed along these lines, as table 6 demonstrates.        
   
Table 6: Budget Constraints and Financial Markets in the FML  
Model  Budget Constraints and Financial Markets 
Taylor and 
O’Connel (1985) 
The budget constraint of the government sector is not respected.
27 Tobinesque 
specifications of households’ demands for financial assets are explicitly mentioned as 
desirable “extensions” of the model. The determinants of the households’ demand for 
stocks are assumed to be the same of firms’ demand for investment (expected 
profitability and rl), so there’s an implicit “liquidity preference” effect on the model.   
Franke and 
Semmler  (1989) 
Same as Taylor and O’Connel, with the difference that banks and financing decisions 
of firms are explicitly modeled. Also, their hypotheses that the net worth of firms and 
banks are zero change the relevant budget constraints.    
Lavoie 
(1986-1987) 
Financial Markets’ behavior is ignored.   
Delli Gatti 
et. al. (1994) 
The budget constraints of households, government and banks are ignored. The budget 
constraint of firms is only implicit. Only the market for loans is explicitly modeled, the 
other financial markets being ignored.  
   
Skott (1994, 
appendix) 
The budget constraints of households, government and banks are ignored. Only the 
market for loans is explicitly modeled, the other financial markets being ignored.    
   
                                                 
25 See appendix 2 above for details. See, also, Backus et.al. (1980), Tobin (1982), Godley (1999a) and Lavoie and 
Godley (2001-2002).  
26 See, for example, Godley (1996, p. 23).  




4.5 – Inflation and Capacity Utilization in the FML 
Inflation plays a crucial role in Minskyan analyses. As he put it himself (1982, p.57), the effects 
of “Big government” and lax monetary policy-making, the traditional medicines against debt 
deflations, are not necessarily brilliant in the long run: “stagflation is the price we pay for the 
success we have had in avoiding a great or serious depression. The techniques that have been 
used since the mid-sixties to abort the debt deflations have clearly been responsible for the 
stepwise acceleration of the inflation rates [in the 1970s] (…) inflation has been the corollary of 
the validation of an inept business structure and poorly chosen investments by government 
deficits and thus inflation has been associated with a decline in the rate of growth.” While 
Minsky’s particular view on this issue is debatable, it’s very difficult to deny the importance of 
dealing with inflation in models prone to “explosive” behavior (such as many in the FML). 
Inflation provides, after all, the “ceiling” that―together with stock (say, of public debt, or 
private capital)-flow (say, of interest payments on public debt or of output) relations―makes 
the application of “naive” Keynesian policies unacceptable.         
  But inflation is crucial in Minskyan-type analyses for other reasons. First and foremost, 
inflation affects the “real” value of financial stocks and flows, and therefore the “real” aggregate 
budget constraints of the macroeconomic sectors. As discussed above, our stock-flow consistent 
accounting framework changes considerably when “real” capital gains/losses due to inflation are 
considered. Inflation is far from neutral for it benefits debtors (in case their contracts are 
phrased in nominal terms) and hurts owners of financial wealth. Moreover, from a purely formal 
point of view it does make a difference whether behavioral assumptions are supposed to 
determine “nominal” or “real” variables in a model. If the latter is the case, then the hypotheses 
assumed about inflation will interfere with virtually all the variables in the model, therefore 
potentially changing its dynamic behavior (e.g. changing a “simple” linear model in a 
complicated non-linear one).  
Of the FML papers discussed here, only Lavoie’s discusses inflation. As he points out 
(Lavoie, 1986-1987, p. 263, emphasis in the original) “(…) an investment boom (…) may 
require a constant rate of growth in the share of profits (in national income), which in turn, 
“ceteris paribus” implies an increasing rate of growth of prices,” especially if one adds a 
“feedback relation between the nominal wage rate and the share of profits” (ibid, p.264) close to 
the ones proposed by, among others, Minsky and Ferri (1984, p. 491) and Kaldor (1985, p. 38-





28 The specific “trigger mechanism” to a Minskyan debt-deflation process 
proposed by Lavoie (i.e. an increase in the nominal interest rate, forced by the unwillingness of 
rentiers to “lose purchasing power”) is not, however, satisfactory in our view. It’s not 
obvious―or even likely―that the “real” financial fragility of firms would increase with 
inflation in the absence of “real” (not merely nominal) increases in the interest rate.   
  This lacuna in the FML is particularly problematic if one considers that macroeconomic 
policy-making today is based on a New Keynesian “consensus,” according to which monetary 
policy should follow “broadly specified rules” determining the level of interest rates as a 
function of inflationary behavior (Arestis and Sawyer, 2002). Minsky’s own views on the issue 
are well more sophisticated than that, but it’s doubtful they could be phrased with the help of the 
FML models discussed so far. SFC “inflation accounted” versions of these models do provide, 
in our opinion, a much better starting point for this kind of discussions.
29        
 
5 – A CLOSER LOOK AT THE TAYLOR-O’CONNEL MODEL  
  
We singled out the Taylor-O’Connel model for various reasons. First, it is a break-through 
model that still remains a crucial reference in the FML. Second, the SFC approach has many 
elements in common with Taylor’s own brand of structuralism (see, e.g., Taylor, 1991 and 
2004). Third, it is our belief that the properties of the model weren’t fully worked out in the 
original paper. In particular the model contains a series of hidden assumptions, being therefore 
particularly suited to our purposes.  
An obvious way to start is to note that there are no banks in the Taylor-O’Connel model, 
so L = Bb = A = Hb = 0. Given that there are no banks, we can get rid also of the central bank, 
consolidating its accounts with the general government (so Bc becomes zero). Last, but not 
least, Taylor and O’Connel assume that Mf = 0. The balance sheets for their model are 
presented in table 7 below, and the reader is welcomed to derive the relevant flows of funds and 
uses and sources tables with the help of tables 2 and 3 above.  
                                                 
28 Godley and Cripps (1983, p. 255) and Kaldor (1985, p. 37) phrase this point very carefully.   





Table 7. Balance sheets in Taylor and O’Connel’s  “artificial economy.” A (+) sign before 
a variable denotes an asset while a (-) sign denotes a liability 
 Households  (Rentiers)  Firms  Government  Total 
1 - High powered money          +Hh     -H  0 
3 – Bills
30      +B   -B  0 
4 - Capital         +K    +K 
5 - Equities   +E pe  -E pe    0 
6 – Net Worth                           + Vh  + Vf  -B – H   +K 
 
  Taylor and O’Connel present their model in a most peculiar way. Even though the model 
has a government sector, the equilibrium conditions in the goods’ market is derived for an 
economy without government. The basic assumptions of the model are that households can be 
divided (a la Kalecki) in workers―who spend all their wage income W and, therefore, have 
zero wealth―and rentiers who receive all private non-wage income (FT–W+rb-1B–1  , 
presumably, even though interest payments on government bills are never mentioned in the 
text)
31 and save a fraction s of it. Also a la Kalecki the general level of prices (p) is given by a 
mark-up formula (p = (1 + ro)*wage/prod, where ro is the mark up, wage is the nominal wage 
rate and prod is the average labor productivity coefficient). Now, if there is no government 
sector and therefore no taxes and no government bills to buy (so that B = IT = DT = 0), then S 
≡ FT + W, it is easy to derive a condition for the equilibrium in the goods’ market that depends 
in a nice way on the profits rate.  Indeed, in equilibrium: 
 
S = p*Sk = C + I, or equivalently,  
S – C = SAV = I = ∆K 
 
So if : 
C = W + (1-s)*FT; and   
I = ∆K = [g0 + h(r + Ф – rb)]*K (see table 3 above), and 
W = wage*Sk/prod (from the price equation) 
                                                 
30 We simplify things here assuming that government debt consists only of cash and government bills, as opposed 
to bonds.   





it is easy to prove that: 
FT = S – W = (1+ro)W – W = roW 
 
so that 
C = W + (1-s)*roW 
SAV = S – W  - (1– s)*roW = s*roW = s*FT = s*r*K  
(if we define the profit rate “r” as the ratio of total profits over the reposition cost of aggregate 
capital, (r = FT/K): 
 
The equilibrium in the goods’ market in this case is give by: 
 
s*r*K = [g0 + h(r + Ф – rb)]*K 
 
which enables one to conclude (after dividing everything by K, solving for “r” and plugging it 
back in the investment function) that the equilibrium value of the “investment growth” g = 
∆K/K is given by: 
geq = ∆K/K =s[g0 + h(Ф – rb)]/(s-h)  
 
The problem with such a derivation is, of course, that it doesn’t hold for an economy 
with a government sector. Later in the text, Taylor and O’Connel acknowledge that: “to 
complete the dynamics, government policy behavior must be specified.” They do that by fixing 
“government expenditures as a proportion of the capital stock and taxes as a proportion of 
expenditures” and state that “ on these assumptions (…) [the total fiscal debt, B+H, divided by 
the nominal capital stock, K] is fixed, and government spending disappears as an autonomous 
component of the capital stock growth rate, g.” Both the statements above are problematic. First, 
without a full specification of the government policy behavior, one cannot get even the static 
equilibrium condition of the model. Second, the fact that the nominal interest on government 
bills is assumed to be positive, makes Taylor and O’Connel’s second conclusion about the 
constancy of the (B+H)/K ratio to depend on “hidden assumptions.” Third, and related to the 
other two, it’s not at all clear what exactly Taylor and O’Connel mean by “government 




  Beginning by this last topic, we note that different taxes have different implications to 
the short run equilibrium conditions for the “real” side of the economy  (the “IS” part of the 
Taylor-O’Connel’s model). If, following most Keynesian textbooks, taxes are modeled as direct 
taxes (i.e., IT = 0), it is obvious that capitalists and workers will only be able to spend their 
disposable incomes. In this interpretation, we assume that DT = τS, so that (assuming also that 
government expenditures in goods
32 are fixed as a proportion of K, so that G = υK), we have 
that in equilibrium:    
 
SAV = Spriv + Sg = I = ∆K 
where: 
Spriv =W + FT + rb-1B-1– C - τS = (1+ro)W + rb-1*B-1– C - τS  and  
Sg = τS – υK – rb-1B-1 
 
and, assuming that C=(1- τ)W+ (1-s)*[(1-τ)roW+ rb-1*B-1], i.e. that the taxation of wages and 
profits is the same, and that rentiers save a fraction s of their total disposable income, one is led 
to conclude that, in equilibrium: 
 
[s(1- τ)ro + τ(1+ ro)]W – (1-s)* rb-1B-1 – υK = [g0 + h(r + Ф – rb)]K 
 
Or, equivalently,  
[s(1- τ) + τ(1+ro)/ro]*rK  – (1-s)*rb-1B-1– υK = [g0 + h(r + Ф – rb)]K  (*) 
 
and, therefore, it is pretty obvious that the equilibrium profit rate “r” and, therefore, investment 
will depend on past interest rates, a hypothesis that is not discussed by Taylor and O’Connel.  
Of course there are ways to save Taylor and O’Connel’s “IS” formalization but all of 
them involve some sort of “hidden assumption,” what is precisely the point we want to make 
here. In particular, things look much better if one assumes that the interest income received by 
rentiers is all spent (i.e. that rentiers treat their different incomes differently). If this is the case, 
the term (1-s)* rb-1*B-1becomes zero in equation (*) above and things get considerably clearer 
algebraically. Indeed, we would now have: 
                                                 
32 As Taylor and O’Connel say nothing about this, one could very well interpret them as assuming that G + rb(-




[ s(1- τ) + τ(1+ro)/ro]*rK   – υK = [g0 + h(r + Ф – rb)]K  (*) 
 
a result more in line with Taylor and O’Connel’s.   
It so happens, however, that the “LM” part of the model is also unclear, again in part due 
to the somewhat casual specification of the government sector in the model. In particular, the 
hypotheses above do not necessarily imply that (B+H)/K will be constant, as assumed by the 
authors. Given the role played in the model by the supply of money and government bills in the 
determination of the interest rates and (therefore) accumulation, the issue is a crucial one.     
In particular, given the hypotheses above, we have that: 
 
B+H = B-1*(1+ rb-1)+H-1 - τ(1+ro)W + υK  
 
So it’s unclear whether or not the ratio of the expression above to K will actually 
converge to a constant. Then again, one possible way out of this problem is to “change” the 
fiscal assumptions to, say, G +  rb-1B-1=  υK  or DT + rb-1B-1=  τS.  The problem with these 
procedures are two. First, they introduce “hidden” hypotheses about either direct taxation or 
government expenditures (i.e., the fact that they fluctuate to accommodate changes in the 
interest payments to rentiers). Given that the model is based on the assumption that the two 
classes have different propensities to consume, these “hidden” hypotheses are bound to have 
real effects. Second, any such modification would have to be incorporated also in the IS, 
therefore, bringing back (in some form) the impact of the stock of government bills in the 
investment flows discussed above.               
   The main conclusion of this section is, therefore, that the specific formalization used by 
Taylor and O’Connel (1985) only holds under a number of “hidden” hypotheses all related to 
stock-flow consistency issues. This is not to say, of course, that the main insight of their model 
(i.e., the possibility of a explosive behavior, as discussed in section 4 above) is ruled out in more 
general cases. Whether or not this is the case, however, can only be rigorously discussed in light 
of the “general framework” proposed above
33.   
                                                 
33 We are well aware, of course, that more general SFC frameworks can be obtained, either by including other 
financial assets (and, therefore, markets) and/or macroeconomic sectors in the analysis, or by simply filling up 
the empty spaces in tables 1-3 above. An example of such a framework can be found in Godley and Lavoie 
(forthcoming, ch.11). We do believe, however, that the particular “scale” we used to draw our “map” here is the 




6 – FINAL REMARKS  
 
Chick (1992, p.81) notes that “from writing (…) [a SFC] paper,” she “learned, gradually, that 
economics is not about the logical consistency of models.” We strongly disagree. Like Lavoie 
and Godley (2001-02, p.131), we do believe that the SFC approach provides an alternative [and 
rigorous] foundation for Post-Keynesian macroeconomic modeling, which “as reported by 
Chick (1995), is sometimes accused of lacking coherence, formalism, and logic.”  
  Indeed, the criticisms made here are constructive. In particular, we do acknowledge the 
seminal character of the FML and sympathize with its “spirit.” Besides, and more importantly, 
the SFCL criticism contains the seeds of its own solution, for in pointing out the inconsistencies 
or lacunae in existing models the SFCL is directly contributing to their development. As 
discussed above, many SFC versions of the FML models discussed here can be formulated. The 
stock-flow consistency of macroeconomic models is not, however, a mere detail. Inconsistent 
models can behave “incoherently” for reasons quite different from the ones Minsky had in mind. 
Besides, one can never underestimate the need to shed light on the implicit and hidden 
assumptions of “elegant” and/or “smart” and/or “parsimonious” models that try to describe the 
behavior of “economies as a whole” with a couple of equations. By doing that, one gets a more 
in-depth (and rigorous) understanding of how these economies really work, a point that 
concerns Post-Keynesian economists more directly than others, given their emphasis on 
explanatory over predictive power.  
In previous sections we reviewed the general tenets of both the “Stock-Flow Consistent” 
and the “Formal Minskyan” literatures (sections 1 and 2) and argued (in sections 4 and 5) that 
the advantages and weaknesses of the latter get clearer when analyzed with the tools of the 
former.
34 We made this point analyzing a small but representative and influential sample of 
seminal “formal Minskyan” models (in section 4), particularly  the Taylor-O’Connel model (in 
section 5) in light of a fully consistent “Minskyan artificial economy” (presented in section 3) 
and showing they often assume oversimplified hypotheses (that don’t do justice to the richness 
of Minskyan analyses) and, more seriously, often ignore the logical implications of these 
hypotheses. Finally we argued that most of these problems can be tackled when FM models are 
                                                 
34 In fact we believe the two literatures to be highly complementary. In particular, we strongly believe the SFCL 
has a lot to gain by incorporating Minskyan insights about the relations between financial fragility, aggregate 
investment and banking behavior. The papers by Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) and Zezza and Dos Santos 




phrased as “closures” of the “general Minskyan” accounting framework described here (in 
section 3) and in Zezza and Dos Santos (forthcoming). Given the analytical rigor and conceptual 
clarity of the proposed framework, we strongly believe that such a move will make the goal of a 
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